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Abstract 
In three experiments, we examine whether individuals cheat more when other individuals can 
benefit from their cheating (they do) and when the number of beneficiaries of wrongdoing is 
larger (they do). Our results indicate that people use moral flexibility in justifying their self-
interested actions when such actions benefit others in addition to the self. Namely, our findings 
suggest that when others can benefit from one’s dishonesty people consider larger dishonesty as 
morally acceptable and thus can benefit from their cheating and simultaneously feel less guilty 
about it. We discuss the implications of these results for collaborations in the social realm.    
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It seems a day doesn’t go by without a revelation of unethical behavior by a politician, a 
movie star, a professional athlete, or a high-ranking executive. Consider the realm of sports for a 
moment. Over the last decade, sports fans have endured a steady diet of news about high-profile 
athletes who have been caught using drugs or steroids. In one recent case from Major League 
Baseball, pitcher Andy Pettitte was accused of using human growth hormones, a substance 
banned by the league. In one of his public admissions, Pettitte confessed that he did not take the 
drugs “to try to get an edge on anyone,” nor “to try to get stronger, faster, or to throw harder.” 
Rather, he took the substance in an effort to get off the disabled list so that he “would not let his 
team down.” Interestingly, this is not an isolated case in which an individual has tried to explain 
unethical actions (e.g., cheating or lying) as being motivated by the benefits these actions accrue 
to others. Consider the white lies parents tell their children to prompt better outcomes for their 
children, such as “Santa Claus will come down the chimney” or “If you don’t eat your crusts, 
your hair won’t grow.” All these examples highlight how the potential benefits to others can 
motivate a person’s own lies. However, in many of them the lies do not only benefit others, but 
also bear direct benefits to the self.     
These examples lead us to wonder how the presence of others who may benefit from our 
dishonesty influences our willingness to cross ethical boundaries.
1 This paper suggests that the 
potential benefits dishonesty may create for others not only help us justify our bad behavior but 
also serve as a (self-serving) motivator for it. We propose and find that by focusing on the social 
utility of others, people can more freely categorize their own actions in positive terms and avoid 
negative updating of their moral self-image (Baumeister 1998; Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; 
Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002). As a result, people feel less guilty about their dishonest behavior 
when others (in addition to themselves) can benefit from them.  
                                                 
1 Following prior research, in this paper we use the terms unethical, dishonest, and immoral as interchangeable. Self-serving Altruism  4 
Cheating Motivated by Potential Benefits to Others 
The corporate scandals of the early 2000’s and the financial meltdown of 2008, combined 
with increasing media and government scrutiny of the decisions that both organizations across 
industries and individuals across contexts make alert us to the importance of understanding what 
causes people to behave unethically. In response to the growing evidence for unethical behavior 
in organizations and society more broadly, there has been an increase in ethics related research 
from scholars in a variety of disciplines, from economics (e.g., Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Gneezy, 
2005) and psychology (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Monin & Jordan, 2009) to management (e.g., Brown & 
Treviño, 2006; Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma, 2004; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008) and 
decision making (e.g., Chugh, Bazerman, Banaji, M., 2005; Kern & Chugh, 2009; Mazar et al., 
2008; Messick & Bazerman, 1996; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). This research has identified 
several factors that lead even individuals who value honesty and believe strongly in their own 
morality to cross ethical boundaries (see Ayal & Gino, 2011 for a recent review).  
Ethical dilemmas often involve resolving an apparent conflict: by behaving ethically, 
people are able to maintain their positive self-image; by behaving unethically, they can advance 
their self-interest (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead & Ariely, 2011; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, 
& Ariely, 2009). People often resolve this apparent conflict through creative reassessments and 
self-serving rationalizations (Gino & Ariely, 2012), such that they can act dishonestly enough to 
profit from their unethicality, but honestly enough to maintain a positive self-concept (e.g., Gino, 
Ayal & Ariely, 2009; Mazar et al., 2008). Recent research has found that when individuals have 
the opportunity to cheat in situations where the probability of being caught and reputational costs 
are minimized, most people do cheat, but not as much as they possibly could (e.g., Ayal & Gino, 
2011; Gino et al., 2009). They cheat enough to benefit financially from their dishonesty, but not Self-serving Altruism  5 
to the point that they feel they need to negatively revise their self-image of good and honest 
people (Mazar & Ariely, 2006). For example, in a typical experiment (see Mazar et al., 2008) 
participants received a set of questions and were promised a fixed financial reward for each one 
they solved correctly. In the control condition, the correct answers were verified by the 
experimenter, and served as the baseline for performance on this task. In the experimental 
conditions, once they completed the task, participants were instructed to shred their answer 
sheets and simply report the number of questions they solved correctly. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
the results showed that when given the opportunity to cheat, individuals indeed cheated. What 
was slightly more interesting was that respondents did not cheat by much (15-20%), and what 
was most interesting was that the extent of dishonest behavior was not sensitive to changes in the 
magnitude of payment or the probability of being caught (i.e., the external rewards), but rather it 
was sensitive to reflection on one’s own moral standards (the internal rewards). 
People can recruit a variety of reasons to justify “minor” cheating, and their creativity 
helps them in this process (Gino & Ariely, 2012). For instance, they could state that other people 
would surely cheat under the same circumstances or that a little cheating won’t hurt anyone. 
People may make these (self-serving) justifications to convince themselves and others that their 
behavior is in fact ethical (Bies, 1987; Gino & Ariely, 2012; Tedeschi & Rosenfeld, 1981). For 
instance, in one experiment, Diekmann (1997) found that participants allocating a sum of money 
between their group and a competing group took a significantly greater share of the resource than 
did participants allocating between themselves and a competing individual. It appears that having 
the available justification that group members will benefit from one’s selfish behavior enables 
people to hide their self-serving motivation (Diekmann, 1997). More recently, Wiltermuth 
(2011) extended these findings to the ethics context, and found that people are more likely to Self-serving Altruism  6 
engage in unethical behavior if they split the spoils of such behavior with another person than 
when they are the only ones benefitting from it. This is because they find it easier to discount the 
moral concerns associated with unethical behavior that benefits another person than to discount 
behavior that only benefit oneself (Wiltermuth, 2011; see also Gino & Pierce, 2010). Overall, 
this research suggests that people use the potential benefits for others as a way to justify their 
self-serving and often unethical actions. When dishonest actions only benefit the self, there is 
little doubt that such actions were motivated by the desire to maximize one’s own outcome. Yet 
this clear self-serving motivation becomes clouded when there are other beneficiaries of one’s 
cheating. In this case, the presence of others who benefit from one’s dishonest actions creates 
ambiguity about one’s motives for cheating. Perhaps, the most famous archetypical example of 
such reframing is Robin Hood, who in the name of justice robbed the rich to give to the poor. 
Clearly, in the eyes of others as well as in one’s own eyes cheating that creates benefits for 
others is likely to be judged as more morally acceptable than cheating that creates benefits only 
for the self.  
In addition to using others to justify selfish behavior, research shows that people truly 
care about improving the outcomes of their peers (e.g., Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 
1989). According to this research, the utility function that individuals gather from monetary 
outcomes is a composite of nonsocial utility (one’s own payment) and social utility (another’s 
payment) (Loewenstein et al., 1989; Messick & Sentis, 1985). Consistent with this explanation, 
prior research has found that concern for the outcome and well-being of others can lead people to 
behave unethically when they feel empathy toward the beneficiaries of their dishonesty (Gino & 
Pierce, 2009) or feel similar to them (Gino et al., 2009).  Self-serving Altruism  7 
Taken together, these findings suggest two different mechanisms through which the 
presence of other beneficiaries of one’s own dishonesty may lead to increased cheating. First, the 
presence of other beneficiaries simply may help people easily justify their dishonesty. Second, 
people may genuinely care about the potential benefits of their actions for others. We conducted 
three experiments to investigate how these two mechanisms interact to affect dishonesty.  
Our research contributes to prior work demonstrating that the presence of beneficiaries 
influences one’s own likelihood to behave dishonestly (e.g., Gino & Pierce, 2009; Wiltermuth, 
2011) by distinguishing between different mechanisms that may explain greater cheating when 
the benefits are split with others. In addition, our research considers cases in which more than 
just one beneficiary can benefit from one’s cheating. Finally, different from prior investigations, 
the current paper directly examines the consequences of cheating that benefit oneself only versus 
cheating that benefit oneself as well as others on both one’s own levels of guilt and moral self-
image. We predicted that although participants would be more likely to behave unethically when 
others in addition to themselves could benefit from their dishonesty, they would also experience 
less guilt after their cheating. As a result, they would be better able to preserve their moral self-
image. 
The Present Research 
We tested our main hypotheses in three experiments in which people had the opportunity 
to cheat by misreporting their performance on an ability-based task, and earn more money as a 
result of it. In the control conditions, once they finished the task they reported their performance 
and were paid accordingly. In the experimental conditions, once they finished the task they were 
asked to shred or recycle their worksheets, report their own performance, and then they were 
paid accordingly. Thus, the participants in the experimental conditions had the opportunity to Self-serving Altruism  8 
cheat by misreporting their performance and earning undeserved money. In the dyad (or group) 
conditions, performance was totaled for all members, and their individual payment was equal to 
the total payoff divided by the number in the dyad or group. Across the three experiments, we 
used different manipulations and different tasks and measured the results in terms of unethical 
behavior.  
Experiment 1  
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 193 students (105 male; Mage = 21, SD = 
1.75). Our first study employed two between-subjects manipulations: the possibility of cheating 
(control vs. shredder) and the party who stands to gain from the act of cheating (individual vs. 
dyad vs. group).  
Procedure. Participants received the entire set of instructions for the experiment, such 
that they knew exactly what it would involve. Each participant received a test sheet with 20 
matrices and a separate collection slip on which to later write down how many of the matrices 
they solved correctly. Each matrix included a different set of 12 three-digit numbers (e.g., 6.18, 
see Mazar et al., 2008), and participants had five minutes to find two numbers per matrix that 
added up to 10. In all conditions, participants received $0.50 for each matrix solved correctly. 
In the individual-control condition, once the five minutes had passed, participants 
counted the number of matrices they had solved correctly and then wrote down that number on 
their collection slips. They then handed both the test and the collection slip to the experimenter. 
The experimenter verified how many matrices were solved correctly and paid participants based 
on their performance. Self-serving Altruism  9 
In the individual-shredder condition, once the five minutes had passed, participants were 
asked to count the number of matrices they had correctly solved, to place the test sheet into a 
shredder, and only then to write down the number of correctly solved matrices on their collection 
slip. They then handed their collection slip to the experimenter and were paid based on their 
reported performance without any verification process. The difference in performance between 
the control and shredder conditions measures participants’ degree of dishonesty. 
In the dyad-control condition, once the five minutes had passed, participants counted the 
number of matrices they had solved correctly and then wrote that number on their collection 
slips. Participants were next asked to find their “partner”—a fellow participant with the same ID 
number at the top of his or her collection slip, but on a different color paper. Once a dyad was 
united, the two dyad members were asked to show each other their collection slips. Next, they 
each summed up their dyad’s total performance and wrote this figure down on their own 
collection slips. Finally, each dyad approached the experimenter together and submitted their 
collection slips and worksheets, and then each dyad member was paid according to half of their 
joint performance, which was verified by the experimenter. 
In the dyad-shredder condition, once the five minutes had passed, participants 
individually counted the number of matrices they had solved correctly, placed the test sheet into 
a shredder, and only then wrote down the number of correctly solved matrices on their collection 
slips. Participants were next asked to find their partner. The rest of the procedure was the same 
as that used in the dyad-control condition, but without any verification process.   
Finally, the procedure in the three-person group condition was the same as in the dyad 
conditions but with three people, and each group member received one third of the total payment 
for the group. Self-serving Altruism  10 
Results  
We first computed the average reported performance for each of the conditions 
(individual, dyad, and group). We then used this number as the dependent variable in a 2 
(possibility of cheating) X 3 (group type) between-subjects ANOVA. This analysis revealed a 
significant main effect for both the possibility of cheating (F[1, 78   ]  =  169, p < .001, η
2 = .69) 
and group size (F[2, 78] = 8.06, p = .001, η
2 = .17), as well as a significant interaction (F[2, 78] 
= 7.52, p = .001, η
2 = .16).
2 
Importantly, performance was very similar across the three control conditions (F<1), 
suggesting that group size did not increase motivation or ability to perform on the problem-
solving task  (see Figure 1). In contrast, when cheating was possible (i.e., in the three shredder 
conditions), we did observe increased “performance,” which varied depending on the number of 
beneficiaries (F[2, 39]  = 10.93, p < .001, η
2 = .36). Planned contrasts showed that participants in 
the dyad-shredder condition reported a higher number of correctly solved matrices (M = 13.83, 
SD = 2.65) than did participants in the individual-shredder condition (M = 11.07, SD = 3.24; p < 
.01). In addition, participants in the group-shredder condition reported a higher number of 
correctly solved matrices (M = 15.92, SD = 2.07) than did participants in either the dyad-
shredder condition (p < .05) or the individual-shredder condition (p < .001).  
Discussion 
Replicating past research (Mazar et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2009), the results of our first 
experiment show that when people have the opportunity to cheat, they do so to a certain extent, 
although not to the maximum possible level. More interestingly, the results show that whenever 
cheating benefits other people (as in the dyad-shredder or in the group-shredder conditions), 
                                                 
2 We report the results on the individual level. However, the nature and significance of the results did not change 
when we conducted our analyses by randomly aggregating individuals in groups of two or three members.  Self-serving Altruism  11 
dishonesty increases, and that this increase is influenced by the number of people who stand to 
benefit from one’s own unethical actions. The more people can benefit from an individual’s 
unethical actions, the greater the cheating. This result is consistent with our predictions, and 
suggests that the presence of other beneficiaries facilitates dishonest behavior.  
Experiment 2 
Our second experiment examines whether focusing on the benefits one’s own cheating 
produces for others can help people maintain a positive moral self-image. In addition, this second 
study allows us to test the plausibility of an alternative explanation for the results of Experiment 
1. According to this explanation, an increased group size also meant lower financial benefit from 
cheating (Individual: one would get the full benefit of cheating; Dyad: half of it; Group: a third 
of it). Thus, the increase in cheating observed in Experiment 1 might be a result of the change in 
financial incentives participants had across conditions. Finally, to eliminate any expectation of 
reciprocity participants may have had in Experiment 1, we also modified the study procedure so 
that the potential beneficiaries of one’s own cheating were randomly selected participants from 
another experiment instead of group members participating in the same study. 
Method 
Participants and design. One-hundred seven college students at a university in the 
United States (58 male; Mage = 20.64, SD = 1.56) participated in the study for pay ($3 show-up 
fee in addition to the opportunity to earn more money throughout the study). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions: self-only high payoff condition, self-only low 
payoff condition, and self-and-other payoff condition.  
Procedure. We used the same problem-solving task as in Experiment 1, but we modified 
the procedure so that we could directly track who cheated by over-reporting performance on the Self-serving Altruism  12 
task. In this study, participants did not shred their test sheet but instead put them into a recycle 
box without any information about their identity. All participants received the same matrices to 
solve in the five-minute time period, except that a single number was unique for each participant. 
One of the three-digit numbers in the matrix used as an example on the back of each collection 
slip matched the unique number on the corresponding test sheet. This allowed us to match the 
worksheet with the collection slip of each participant at the end of the study (without knowing 
the identity of the participant) and compute the difference between self-reported performance 
and actual performance. This difference score was our main dependent variable.  
Payoff manipulation. Across conditions, we manipulated the payoff structure. In the 
self-only high (low) payoff condition, participants were told they would receive $2 ($1) for each 
correctly solved problem. In the self-and-other payoff condition, participants were told they 
would receive $1 for each correctly solved problem and that another participant randomly 
selected from a group of participants from another experiment would also receive $1 for each 
correctly solved problem. We included two self-only-payoff conditions (high and low) because 
we wanted to make sure that the differences observed in our first experiment were not driven by 
the perception that cheating for a larger payoff ($2 to the self instead of just $1) is more 
unethical. 
Guilt and moral self-image. After filling out their collection slips, participants answered 
a short questionnaire. In addition to answering some bogus questions, participants indicated the 
extent to which they felt remorse, guilt, and regret (α = .90) on a 7-point scale (0 = not at all, 7 = 
to a great extent). These are common emotions prior researchers have used to capture state guilt 
(see Marschall, Sanftner, & Tangney, 1994). In addition, participants indicated “how good of a 
person” they felt they were using a 7-point scale (0 = not at all, 7 = very much). Self-serving Altruism  13 
Results  
Cheating. The percent of participants who cheated by over-reporting performance on the 
problem-solving task varied by condition, χ
2(2, N = 107) = 9.70, p < .01 (see Table 1). Fifty-six 
percent of the participants (20/36) cheated in the self-and-other payoff condition, 28% of the 
participants (10/36) cheated in the self-only-high-payoff condition, and 23% of the participants 
(8/35) cheated in the self-only-low-payoff condition. Mirroring these results, the average number 
of matrices by which participants overstated their performance varied by condition (F[2, 125] = 
6.31, p < .01, η
2 = .11). Planned contrasts showed that on average, participants cheated more in 
the self-and-other payoff condition as compared to both the self-only-high-payoff condition 
(p<.01) and the self-only-low-payoff condition (p < .01). The difference in the level of cheating 
between these last two conditions was not significant (p = .79). 
Guilt and moral self-image. We then examined the extent to which participants felt 
guilty and perceived themselves as moral after cheating across conditions. For these analyses, we 
only considered people who cheated. Participants reported less guilt in the self-and-other payoff 
condition as compared to both the self-only-high-payoff condition (p<.01) and the self-only-low-
payoff condition (p < .02), F(2,35) = 6.29, p < .01, η
2 = .26. The difference in the level of guilt 
between these last two conditions was not significant (p = .72). Similarly, participants rated 
themselves as being better people in the self-and-other payoff condition as compared to both the 
self-only-high-payoff condition (p  = .05) and the self-only-low-payoff condition (p < .03), 
F(2,35) = 3.54, p = .04, η
2 = .17.
3  
Mediation analysis. Using mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Preacher and 
Hayes, 2004)), we next tested whether participants who cheated on the problem-solving task in 
                                                 
3 We found no significant differences in guilt across conditions for participants who did not cheat on the problem-
solving task, F(2, 66) = 1.04, p = .36, η
2 = .03. Similarly, we found no significant differences in moral self-image 
across conditions, F(2, 66) < 1. Self-serving Altruism  14 
the self-and-other payoff condition were better able to maintain a moral self-image because they 
experienced lower levels of guilt compared to those who cheated in the other two conditions. 
Once again, we only considered participants who cheated in this analysis. The effect of the self-
and-other payoff condition on perceived moral-self image was reduced to non-significance (from 
β = .41, p = .011, to β = −0.04, p = .71) when experienced guilt was included in the equation, and 
experienced guilt was a significant predictor of participants’ perceived moral self-image (β = 
−0.87, p < .001). A bootstrap analysis showed that the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval 
for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero ([0.45, 1.49]), suggesting a significant indirect 
effect (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007). These results demonstrate that because their 
cheating benefitted others, participants in the self-and-other payoff condition experienced less 
guilt and were consequently better able to maintain a moral self-image compared to participants 
in the self-only-payoff conditions. Importantly, these results also help to rule out the possibility 
that participants are not automatically bolstering their moral self-image after cheating by telling 
themselves that normally they are good, ethical people. 
Correlation analyses. To further explore the data, we conducted correlation analyses 
considering all participants (those who cheated and those who did not cheat). We found that guilt 
was negatively and significantly correlated with ratings of participants’ perceived moral self-
image (r = -0.88, p < .001) and positively and significantly correlated with participants’ extent of 
cheating (r = 0.64, p < .001). The extent of cheating was negatively and significantly correlated 
with participants’ perceived moral self-image (r = -0.54, p < .001). 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 indicate that although participants cheated more they also 
experienced less guilt after their cheating when others could benefit from their dishonesty. As a Self-serving Altruism  15 
result, they more easily preserved their moral self-image as compared to the case in which their 
cheating only benefited the self. In addition, the lack of significant difference in the level of 
cheating (as well as in guilt and in perceived moral self-image) between the self-only-high-
payoff condition and the self-only-low-payoff condition suggests that the amount of financial 
incentive is not the main driver of participants’ decision to cheat, nor of the consequent guilt and 
perceived moral self-image.  
Experiment 3 
So far, we found that when other individuals benefit from one’s own dishonesty, cheating 
increases but one’s own moral self-image is not impacted as much as in the case in which only 
the self benefits. What drives this increased willingness to behave unethically in such situations? 
One possibility is that when others can also benefit from one’s own dishonesty, individuals more 
easily categorize their own bad actions (cheating) in positive terms (creating financial benefits 
for others) and therefore cheat to a larger degree. Alternatively, it is possible that people truly 
care about such benefits and social utility.  
In Experiment 3, we further varied the payoff structure to test whether the increased 
cheating we observed in Experiments 1 and 2 is more likely to be attributed to an increased 
ability to justify dishonest behavior or to truly care for potential benefits to others.  
Method 
Participants and design. One-hundred twenty-eight students from local universities (65 
male; Mage = 21.35, SD = 2.89) participated in the study for pay ($3 show-up fee and the 
opportunity to earn additional money throughout the study). Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of three conditions: self-only payoff, self-and-other payoff, and other-only payoff.  Self-serving Altruism  16 
Procedure. The study included two tasks: a math task (used to assess cheating) and a 
final questionnaire with questions regarding perceived unethicality of acts of cheating. 
Cheating task. Participants engaged in a computer-based mental-arithmetic task in 
which they had to calculate the answers to 20 different problems (e.g., 2+5+23-17+13-8+11-
5+9-3 = ?), presented individually (adapted from von Hippel, Lakin, & Shakarchi, 2005; see also 
Vohs & Schooler, 2008). The experimenter informed participants that the computer had a special 
feature: As they were working on each problem, the correct answer would appear on the screen 
unless they stopped it from being displayed by pressing the space bar right after the problem 
appeared. The experimenter also informed participants that although during the task she would 
not monitor whether they had pressed the space bar or not, they should try to solve the problems 
on their own (thus being honest). Although the experimenter did not monitor participants’ 
actions during the task, the program automatically recorded their number of space-bar presses. 
Following prior research (Jordan et al., 2011; Shu & Gino, 2012; von Hippel et al., 2005; Vohs 
& Schooler, 2008), we used the number of times participants did not press the space bar to 
prevent the answer from appearing as our measure of cheating. By allowing the answers to 
appear on the screen, in fact, participants did not follow the rules specified by the experimenter 
(i.e., try to solve the problems on their own) and walked away with greater payment compared to 
what they would have earned by solving the problems on their own. That is, they received more 
money than they actually deserved (Shu & Gino, 2012). 
Payoff manipulation. Across the three conditions, we implemented different allocations 
of the total payoff. In the self-only payoff condition, participants were told they would receive $2 
for each correctly solved problem. In the self-and-other payoff condition, participants were told 
they would receive $1 for each correctly solved problem. In addition, they were told that another Self-serving Altruism  17 
participant randomly selected from a group of participants from another experiment would also 
receive $1 for each correctly solved problem. Finally, in the other-only payoff condition, 
participants were told that their performance on the task would not influence their payment in the 
study, but that another participant randomly selected from a group of participants from another 
experiment would receive $2 for each correctly solved problem.
4  
Perceived unethicality. After being paid for the task, participants received a one-page 
questionnaire. The instructions informed them that because of the programming feature, “some 
participants may intentionally decide not to press the space bar so that they can see the correct 
answer and successfully solve the problem.” Using 7-point scales, participants then indicated 
how unethical, wrong, and morally unacceptable it would be for a participant not to press the 
space bar in two different instances: 1) when participants were paid $2 for every correctly solved 
problem (α = .78), and 2) when the participant solving the task and another randomly chosen 
participant from another study were both paid $1 for every correctly solved problem (α = .80).    
Predictions 
The payoff manipulation enables us to juxtapose the effects of the ability to justify 
unethical behavior as appropriate and truly caring about others benefits. Specifically, while both 
mechanisms predict an increase in cheating in the self-and-other-payoff condition compared to 
the self-only-payoff condition, they make different predictions about the level of cheating in the 
other-only-payoff condition. In fact, as compared to the self-and-other-payoff condition, there is 
no direct self-interest (money or justification) at play in the other-only-payoff condition, but only 
an increased potential benefit to another person from one’s own cheating.  
                                                 
4 In this study, participants in the other-only payoff condition received $5 in addition to their show-up fee as 
compensation. We conducted another study using the same design and procedure in which participants in the other-
only payoff condition received either $2 or $8 in addition to their show-up fee as compensation. The nature and 
significance of the results did not change with different levels of fixed pay. Self-serving Altruism  18 
Thus, if individuals use the potential benefits for others merely to justify their unethical 
actions, then we would expect the level of cheating to be eliminated in the other-only-payoff 
condition, as any cheating in the other-only-payoff condition would not benefit the self and thus 
eliminate a need for self-justification.  
In contrast, if individuals only care about others’ utility, then we would expect the level 
of social utility to be higher in the other-only-payoff condition (when others benefit 100% from 
an individual’s cheating) than in the self-and-other-payoff condition (when others benefit 50%).  
Finally, if these two factors work in concert to promote dishonesty we should expect that 
cheating will be highest in the self-and-other payoff condition and will be diminished but not 
eliminated in the other two conditions.  
Results  
Cheating. We first examined the number of times participants did not press the space bar 
across conditions, our measure of cheating. This number varied significantly depending on our 
payoff manipulation (F[2, 125] = 4.23, p < .02, η
2 = .06). Participants cheated more frequently in 
the self-and-other payoff condition (M = 11.29, SD = 4.92) as compared to both the self-only-
payoff condition (M = 8.40, SD = 5.83, p < .02) and the other-only-payoff condition (M = 8.16, 
SD = 5.71, p = .01). The amount of cheating did not significantly differ in these last two 
conditions (p = .85). 
Since with this task cheating occurs by omission rather than commission, and since the 
task occurs on multiple rounds (in each of which participants can cheat), most participants cheat 
at least in a few rounds when this task is used (see Shu & Gino, 2012). With this caveat in mind, 
we next examined the percentage of participants who cheated by condition, and found significant 
differences, χ
2(2, N = 128) = 7.07, p = .029. Ninety-eight percent of the participants (41/42) Self-serving Altruism  19 
cheated in the self-and-other payoff condition, 79% of the participants (34/43) cheated in the 
self-only-payoff condition, and 88% of the participants (38/43) cheated in the other-only-payoff 
condition. 
Perceived unethicality. Next, we examined the responses to the follow-up questions 
regarding perceived unethicality to test whether participants considered dishonest behavior to be 
less morally problematic when it benefitted other people in addition to the self rather than the 
self only. A within-subjects analysis revealed that participants rated cheating on the task as more 
unethical when they were told that only they themselves would benefit (M = 5.17, SD = 0.74) 
rather than when they were told that others would also benefit (M = 4.51, SD = 1.07), F(1, 127) 
= 38.84, p < .001, η
2 = .23. (We note that when we also included condition as between-subject 
factor in this analysis, the effect of condition was not significant, nor was the interaction between 
condition and the within-subject factor.)  
We conducted the same within-subjects ANOVA, but this time we included whether or 
not the participant cheated as a control variable. We did so since participants who cheated are 
likely motivated to report that cheating is not that morally wrong (Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 
2010). Given that more participants cheated in the self-and-other payoff condition than in the 
other two conditions, this motivation to justify their behavior may have produced the result for 
perceived unethicality we just discussed. This analysis revealed a significant within-subject 
effect, F(1, 126) = 9.57, p = .002, η
2 = .07. In these two analyses, we considered all participants. 
Finally, we conducted an additional within-subjects analysis by considering only participants 
who cheated on the task (i.e., a subsample of the participants). We again found a significant 
within-subject effect, F(1, 112) = 39.26, p < .001, η
2 = .26 (Monly_self = 5.18, SD = 0.74 vs. Mother 
= 4.47, SD = 1.06). Together, these results suggest that participants who cheated rated their own Self-serving Altruism  20 
behavior (i.e., cheating on the computer-based mental-arithmetic task) as more unethical when 
they were told that only they themselves would benefit rather than when they were told that 
others would also benefit.  
Discussion 
These results show that participants cheated the most in the condition that included the 
opportunity to favor another participant in addition to the self, even if this beneficiary was an 
anonymous stranger. In the other-only-payoff condition, where there was no benefit to the self 
from behaving dishonestly, we still observed some cheating but it was significantly lower than in 
the self-and-other-payoff condition and a bit lower from the self-only-payoff condition.  
This finding suggests that people do care about the benefits that their actions create for 
others. However, this caring has much larger effect on their dishonesty when such actions also 
accrue benefits to the self. In other words, the presence of beneficiaries encourages individuals to 
maximize their social utility but simultaneously allows them to boost their own utility and more 
easily justify their unethical behavior. Indeed, participants in all the three conditions also rated 
their unethical actions as more morally acceptable when others could benefit from them as 
compared to when they created benefits only for the self.  
General Discussion 
  We are all familiar with the many stories that wrongdoers, ranging from Martha Stewart 
to Bernard Madoff, provide for their transgressions. People often highlight the benefits their 
actions accrue to others, such as their clients, shareholders, or the companies for which they 
work. In this paper, we tested whether such claims are only justifications, or whether they could 
also reflect genuine concern about the benefits their actions may produce for others. The results 
presented here demonstrate that when the outcome of an individual’s dishonesty can benefit Self-serving Altruism  21 
another person, the level of individual cheating increases. More specifically, dishonest behavior 
further increases as the number of people benefiting from this dishonesty rises (Experiment 1). 
Cheating motivated by potential benefits to others in addition to the self helps wrongdoers feel 
less guilty about their actions and preserve their moral self-image (Experiment 2). Indeed, when 
there are other beneficiaries for people’s dishonest actions in addition to themselves, they 
perceive their unethical behavior to be morally acceptable (Experiment 3). Finally, the results of 
Experiment 3 demonstrate that even when cheating did not create any benefit to the self but only 
created benefits to another person (i.e., the other-only-payoff condition) some cheating was still 
present. The fact that cheating was not eliminated in this condition indicates that people really 
care for the social utility of others. However, individuals were more likely to behave unethically 
when dishonesty benefited others in addition to the self (i.e., the self-and-other payoff condition). 
These results suggest that social utility and justification work in concert and each factor has an 
additive effect in promoting individuals’ dishonesty. 
This research contributes to the literature on ethical decision making by suggesting that 
dishonesty should be studied not only at the individual level but also at the group level, where 
members can influence one another in their ethical as well as unethical behavior. Previous work 
has shown that both demographic factors (e.g., gender,, age, religion, and ethnicity) and personal 
characteristics (e.g., ethical values, stage of moral development, and individual’s concern for 
self-presentation) influence ethical behavior (Ford & Richardson, 1994; Loe, Ferrell & 
Mansfield, 2000). Previous studies have also identified a number of contextual factors that affect 
intentional unethical behavior, such as the social norms (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Reno, 
Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993), the use of incentives (Flannery & May, 2000; Schweitzer & Croson, 
1999) and the use of codes of ethics (Mazar et al, 2008; Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran, 1999). Self-serving Altruism  22 
The present research points to a different set of variables that drive dishonesty and it emphasizes 
not only individual characteristic or contextual factors but also the nature of our collaborations 
with other people who may benefit from our unethical behavior.   
Taken together, our findings may have serious implications for the study of collaborative 
work in the social realm. Self-managed or empowered teams are one of the most prevalent 
groups in modern corporations (Lawler, Mohrman, & Ledford, 1995). In these teams, decision-
making authority is delegated to individual members, who are in charge of making decisions 
with consequences for their peers and their organization. Our findings suggest that the upside of 
monitoring and empowerment can be overwhelmed by the downsides of the increased moral 
flexibility induced by the presence of others. Thus, one implication can be that some members of 
teams should not be a part of the social circle of the group, and another is the recognition that 
good people who care about their coworkers can in fact end up cheating more. 
Our findings also speak to the choice of most business schools of having students work in 
teams on various assignments. The results presented here suggest that such team settings might 
be conducive of dishonest behavior among group members, and thus might not be ideal to foster 
learning. In addition, and to the extent that higher emphasis on group-based learning can foster a 
higher level of dishonesty, it is important to ask whether such increased cheating in dyad and 
team settings might spill over to tasks students work on individually, and whether it would also 
influence the students’ long-term approach to cheating after they leave school and join the 
workforce.  
In addition to these “spillage” questions, our findings suggest a few additional research 
questions. For instance, further research could explore the relationship between the allocation of 
financial incentives (which were evenly distributed in our case) and dishonesty. Similarly, it is Self-serving Altruism  23 
important to examine the power position within a hierarchy (boss or employee) and their effects 
on unethical behavior. Future research could also explore the boundary conditions of the effects 
demonstrated in our studies. For instance, one could examine the influence of being part of larger 
groups or the impact of friendship and familiarity among group members on individuals’ levels 
of dishonesty. A more nuanced and detailed understanding of cheating within groups could 
suggest a promising path for future research that may examine the best “choice architecture” 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) and identify techniques for gaining the benefits of collaboration 
without paying the cost of dishonesty growth.  
 Self-serving Altruism  24 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Means (and standard deviations) for the main variables measured in Experiment 2 
 
   Percent  of 
participants who 
cheated by over-
reporting 
performance on 
the problem-
solving task 
Number of 
matrices by 
which 
participants 
overstated their 
performance 
(considering all 
participants) 
Self-reported 
guilt 
(considering 
only 
participants 
who cheated) 
Moral self-
image 
(considering 
only 
participants 
who cheated) 
Self-and-other payoff 
condition  56%  3.47 (3.42)  3.90 (0.97)  4.10 (1.02) 
Self-only-high-payoff 
condition  28%  1.44 (2.55)  5.03 (0.92)  3.30 (0.95) 
Self-only-low-payoff 
condition  23%  1.26 (2.74)  4.88 (0.82)  3.13 (1.13) Self-serving Altruism  30 
Figures 
Figure 1. Reported and actual number of correctly identified pairs by experimental condition 
(Experiment 1). Error bars represent standard errors. 
  
 
 
 
  
 